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AbstrAct
While the income per capita in the develop-
ing world since the turn of the Millennium 
has grown faster than that of the developed 
world, the question whether there is an ongo-
ing process of catching up between countries 
remains. The notion of income convergence 
has provided many insights into the sources for 
long-run growth but has largely neglected the 
role of social capabilities in economic develop-
ment. By social capabilities we mean the quali-
fication of the ‘theory of convergence’ which 
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asserts that productivity growth rates between 
countries tend to vary inversely with regard to 
productivity levels. The social capabilities ap-
proach holds that a country’s potential for rap-
id growth is strong when “it is technologically 
backward but socially advanced” (see Abramo-
vitz, 1986:388). This means that the potential 
to catch up under globalization is strongest 
for countries in which social capabilities are 
developed to allow successful use of technolo-
gies and where institutional arrangements are 
conducive to economic progress. Yet there is 
no clear agreement in the literature on the 
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main components of social capabilities or how 
to measure them. Our framework argues that 
the role of capabilities in catching up needs to 
understand them in terms of structural trans-
formation, economic and social inclusion, 
state´s autonomy and accountability. Without 
progress in these dimensions within-country 
inequality may increase and might in turn lead 
to stagnating growth and slim prospects for 
global income convergence.
Key words: Catching up, income gap, 
social capability, shrinking.
crecimiento convergente y  
capacidad social en países  
en desarrollo: una propuesta 
conceptual y de medición
resumen
Desde el cambio del milenio, el pib per cápi-
ta de los países en desarrollo ha crecido más 
rápido que el de los países desarrollados. Sin 
embargo, la pregunta acerca de si estos países 
en desarrollo han comenzado un proceso de 
convergencia con los países más ricos del globo 
se mantiene. La hipótesis de convergencia de 
ingresos cuestiona las fuentes de crecimiento 
a largo plazo, pero ha descuidado en gran 
medida el rol de las capacidades sociales en el 
desarrollo económico. El enfoque de las capa-
cidades sociales sostiene que el potencial de 
crecimiento económico es mayor para los paí-
ses que desarrollan las capacidades sociales que 
permiten la adopción de nuevas tecnologías 
y honran a su vez los arreglos institucionales 
favorables al progreso económico de toda la 
población. Sin embargo, no hay un consenso 
claro en la literatura sobre los principales com-
ponentes de las capacidades sociales o cómo 
medirlas. Este ensayo sostiene que los procesos 
de crecimiento que diversifican la estructura 
económica apoyan la inclusión, la autonomía 
del Estado y la rendición de cuentas del mismo 
frente a la sociedad generan mejoras sosteni-
das en los niveles de ingreso per cápita. Sin el 
desarrollo de estas capacidades, la desigualdad 
económica puede aumentar, situación que 
podría, a su vez, conducir a un estancamiento 
del crecimiento y, por tanto, a reducir las pers-
pectivas de convergencia global de los ingresos 
de los países en desarrollo.
Palabras clave: convergencia económica, bre-
cha de ingresos, capacidad social.
IntroductIon 
Over the last fifteen years, the average growth 
rate of the global economy has been lifted 
by developing countries while being held 
down by developed economies (United Na-
tions Report World Economic Situation and 
Prospects, 2016). We have seen the definitive 
consolidation of the “Asian Tigers” as indus-
trialized economies, the meteoric rise of China 
and India as well as growth figures in Latin 
America and Sub-Saharan Africa far surpassing 
their growth records of the last decades. The 
unanswered question is whether this trend 
will be sustained in the long run and lead to 
a genuine process of economic catching up. 
Influenced by Abramovitz´classic discussion 
of catching up dynamics, the purpose of this 
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note is to propose a conceptual and measure-
ment framework that puts the role of social 
capability in the centre of this debate. 
theorIes of cAtchIng up, 
growth And cApAbIlItIes 
The literature on catching up, or the theory 
of convergence, holds that differences in pro-
ductivity growth rates between countries tend 
to vary inversely with regard to productivity 
levels. Opportunities for higher growth are 
therefore available for developing economies 
by tapping into the potential of the so-called 
advantage of backwardness through access 
to technology and know-how (Abramovitz, 
1986). The experience of economic growth 
in the Western world over the past century 
or more has given support to the hypothesis 
of converging productivity levels (see e.g. 
Baumol, 1986; Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1992; 
Friedman, 1992). In the world at large, the 
picture is different. At least until the turn of 
the Millennium, the empirical evidence in-
dicated divergence rather than convergence 
in the global economy (e.g. Pritchett, 1997; 
Rodrik, 2011; Milanovic, 2016). In general, 
the poorest countries have not been catching 
up or converging in terms of productivity levels 
with the most advances countries. The conver-
gence theory seems to have been applicable to 
East Asia only.
Perhaps the most well cited catching up 
theory applicable to the developing world is the 
“flying geese” model originally framed in the 
Asian context by Akamatsu (1962) and followed 
up by Lin (2011) for global development. Tak-
ing Japan as the benchmark, the original version 
claimed that the division of labor, emulation, 
and spillovers would predict successful develop-
ment patterns of many Asian countries catch-
ing up with Japan. Although based on market 
mechanisms, non-economic institutions were 
part of the dynamics, since the application of 
technological innovations required a learning 
process for making efficient use of available tech-
nology. This in turn required the formation of 
strong financial, educational and legal systems. 
Although a useful metaphore and description of 
development pathways, the flying geese model 
implies that the catching up process is linear, 
uniform and deterministic and therefore of scant 
analytical value. 
A more dynamic, and in our view more 
useful approach, is putting focus on “social 
capabilities”. First proposed by Ohkawa and 
Rosovsky (1973) and elaborated by Abramov-
itz (1986; 1995), it suggested that making use 
of the advantage of backwardness depends on 
the “social capability” available in the catching 
up country. Although elusive, the concept of 
social capability has come to denote the incen-
tive structures that promote innovation and 
investment and the ability to respond to these 
incentives (Rhode & Toniolo, 2006). 
The term might include the compo-
nents of educational levels, the quality of 
institutions, state capacity and social unity. 
Abramovitz (1986) suggested the following 
core components of social capability: mana-
gerial and technical competence, markets and 
institutions able to mobilize capital on a large 
scale, a stable and effective government and 
widespread trust and honesty in the popula-
tion. Yet we have not been successful in iden-
tifying and measuring social capabilities for a 
M a r t i n  A n d e r s s o n  y  A n d r é s  P a l a c i o
1 0
o a s i s ,  N o  2 6  •  J u l i o - D i c i e m b r e  2 0 1 7  •  p p .  7 - 2 3
country in a comparably satisfactory way. The 
concept has been acknowledged as a relevant 
factor for understanding why some economies 
managed to converge to the richest economies 
while others failed, but a clear definition, and 
more concretely an empirically operational ap-
proach, that accommodates the key elements 
and does so in a persuasive and non-arbitrary 
way is missing. 
Social capability is to a large extent ob-
served in industrial countries and seems to 
come from cumulative institutional process 
that have sustained long term growth. This 
implies that the development strategy of de-
veloping countries cannot rest on the same 
set of capability endowments as in developed 
countries. For instance, the demographic pro-
cesses are relatively faster in developing coun-
tries, and therefore investment in labor-saving 
technologies, which have been the key source 
of long-term growth in industrial economies, 
may be considered as less important in the 
short run. Furthermore, sheer popular access 
to productive opportunities or general state 
capacity in developing countries are typi-
cally worlds apart from the already developed 
countries. The difficulties to conceptualise 
and measure social capabilities in developing 
countries also relates to the many variables or 
indicators at play given that we are not sure 
about what to measure. Adelman and Morris 
(1967) pioneered the effort with data on 41 
social, political and economic indicators for 
74 developing countries in the period 1957-
1962. They used factor analysis to reduce the 
many indicators into a small set of composite 
variables and produce three groups of coun-
tries: low, medium and high capability. Since 
this massive work, empirical studies to capture 
the importance of social capability for catch-
ing up have been extensive although attempts 
to further specify the concept have been rare 
(some exceptions are Temple and Johnson, 
1998; Putterman, 2013; Fagerberg, Feldman 
& Srholec, 2014) and seldom used as a way to 
approach the prospects for developing coun-
tries to catch up with the rich. 
Is the developIng world cAtchIng up? 
new pAtterns of globAl growth
Over the period 1950-2016 the income differ-
ence between the richest and poorest countries 
have grown both in absolute and relative terms. 
In fact, the ratio between the top and bottom 
10 countries in the distribution is measured by 
a factor of 20 (ted, 2016). Disparities within 
the European Union, as a reference, are not 
even close to the global figures. In 2016, one 
of the richest countries in the European Union, 
the Netherlands, and the one of the poorest, 
Romania, show a corresponding ratio of per 
capita incomes at 2.4 (ted, 2016). 
It is clear that the world is no longer 
divided between the West and the Rest since 
the Rest is no longer a homogenous unit to 
categorize countries, if it ever was. Based on 
the TED database, we find that catching up 
with the average income level per country in 
Western Europe as the benchmark has only 
been observed in the economies of Pacific Asia 
whereas both Sub-Saharan African (except for 
Botswana and Mauritius) and Latin American 
countries are lagging further behind compared 
to the 1950s. Countries in Subsaharan Africa 
have on average not reached 20 per cent of 
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the income per capita of Western Europe. 
Countries in Latin America are between 20 
and 60 per cent of the income per capita of 
Western Europe, with significant negative 
reversals of Argentina and Venezuela over the 
period 1950-2016. In terms of growth rates in 
the developing world, however, the last 15-20 
years have been higher than in previous peri-
ods, with the possible exception of the 1950s 
(Figure 1).
figure 1
regional average of annual per capita growth compared to global 
average of annual per capita growth (global growth rate=0 %)
Source:	Author´s	calculation	based	on	ted	(2016).	
Notes:	0	on	the	y-axis	is	the	global	average	per	capita	growth.	SSA:	Sub-Saharan	Africa,	LA:	Latin	America	
Are we now witnessing an era of unprec-
edented catching up? The question poses 
some empirical challenges. Although Latin 
America and Sub-Saharan Africa have over 
the past decade shifted towards a remarkable 
growth trajectory no progressive region-wide 
leaps have yet taken place. Rather, in terms 
of world ranking both Latin America and 
Sub-Saharan Africa have gradually lost posi-
tion (Figure 2). Data also reveals that there is 
a process of regional clustering in both Latin 
America and Sub-Saharan Africa over time, 
judging by the coefficients of variation of po-
sitions in the world ranking (Figure 3). This 
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confirms the image of both Latin America 
and Sub-Saharan Africa as convergence clubs 
at the bottom. The opposite is true for Asia, 
where dynamic variations are larger, which 
conforms to the differences between growth 
rates, with a few making it all the way into the 
ranks of high-income countries: the first tier 
East Asian miracles and the ASEAN countries 
that have graduated to middle-income status. 
The picture looks similar if China and India 
are omitted from the analysis.
figure 2
changes in world ranking: regional averages 
Source:	Author´s	calculation	based	on	TED,	the	Total	Economic	Database	-The	Conference	Board,	2016.	Ranking	1	–n	(n=total	
number	of	countries	in	the	world).
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figure 3
coefficient of variation for regions (based on world ranking)
Source:	Author´s	calculation	based	on	ted,	the	Total	Economic	Database	-The	Conference	Board,	2016.
One indirect yet major cause for “forging 
ahead” is actually absolute economic shrink-
ing of gdp per capita. Asian economies have 
forged ahead from other developing regions 
since the 1950s not only because it grew more, 
it also shrank less. Our understanding of catch 
up growth can therefore also be enlighted by 
examining periods of shrinking, or negative 
growth rates. In fact, it seems as if much of 
the success of economic development depends 
on the resilience toward economic shrinking 
(Figure 4). Although economic reversals or cri-
ses have been noted in the literature (Rodrik, 
1999; Pritchett, 1997), the reasons behind 
the phenomenon of economic shrinking has 
received less attention. Since no production 
function can explain why economies shrink, 
other dynamics that needs to be accounted 
for by alternative measures seem to be at 
play. Arguably, resilience towards shrinking 
increases the likelihood for catching up to be 
sustained. The challenge for future research is 
to provide an answer to how some countries 
have been able to change their social and/or 
institutional arrangements in ways that limited 
shrinking and, despite falling average growing 
rates, managed to increase their long run rates 
of growth. The most elaborate treatment is 
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found in Broadberry and Wallis (2016) who 
stress the historical importance of shrinking for 
the rise of the Western world. They argue that 
impersonal rule as the cornerstone of effective 
institutions is the fundamental reason for the 
ability to reduce economic shrinking. For the 
study of developing countries, we believe that 
social capabilities are also key determinants 
of the resilience against economic shrinking. 
figure 4
frequency of shrinking (percentage of years of shrinking per decade) in Asia, lA, ssA
Source:	Author´s	calculation	based	on	ted	(2016).
The fact that two tiers of Asian countries have 
changed their relative position in the income 
ranking indicates that poverty traps to de-
velopment are not destiny. At the same time 
availability of technology and higher returns 
from low level of capital in general seem not 
to be enough to sustain long term growth 
and reduce shrinking (Broadberry & Wallis, 
2016). We need to dig deeper to understand 
whether and to what extent growth might be 
sustained and this is why we need to find ways 
to grasp the capabilities that enable economies 
to embark upon a sustained development path.
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A conceptual framework and four 
dimensions of social capability 
We propose a conceptual framework and a 
set of indicators to measure the role of social 
capability in the global income hierarchy. We 
follow quite closely the Kuznets-inspired dis-
cussion by Abramovitz (1995), which asserts 
that social capability basically consists of ele-
ments relating to (1) “people’s basic social at-
titudes and political institutions” and (2) “the 
ability to exploit modern technology”. From 
these two basic elements, we derive four inter-
related, yet distinct, dimensions: inclusion, 
autonomy, accountability and transformation. 
Adhering to (1), which, according to Abramo-
vitz, contains social arrangements for effective 
incentives, we regard this as “inclusion”, that 
is the structures in which people operate – the 
economic, social, political, cultural and envi-
ronmental conditions - which are crucial for 
individual access to productive resources and 
the sense of national belonging. Regarding ef-
fective political institutions, we believe them 
to be captured by the “autonomy” and “ac-
countability” of the State. The latter category 
(2), the ability to exploit modern technology, 
is at the social level effectively synonymous 
with “transformation”, which is an indicator 
of the ability of an economy to allocate pro-
ductive resources to economic activities with 
higher value added, including labor, and its 
willingness to be engaged with the risks of the 
international economy. 
Unlike the groundbreaking attempt by 
Adelman and Morris (1967), who replaced a 
group of target variables through factor analy-
sis, we have assigned responsibility for the real-
ization of certain dimensions to processes, even 
though their dynamics are closely associated. 
Figure 5 shows the four related dimensions 
for understanding social capability: ”transfor-
mation”, “inclusion”, “autonomy”, and “ac-
countability”. In sum, self-sustained growth is 
a function of the ability to adapt the structure 
of the economy to continuous technological 
change, to include people in through a social 
contract that shares the surplus in the economy 
and eases the greater exposure to the risks of the 
international economy, without eroding the 
modernization and nation-building properties 
of the State. The four dimensions, or processes, 
of social capability aimed to reflect the deeper 
forces at play for countries’ ability to build 
resilience to economic shrinking and achieve 
sustainable catching up. For each of these di-
mensions we also suggest some indicators to 
measure their impact on the development of 
the studied countries and period.
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figure 5
A conceptual framework of social capability: the four dimensions
transformation
We examine the driving forces of agricultural 
transformation, which according to theory 
and broad empirical findings are the defining 
processes for the transition into a diversified 
economy (Ranis & Fei, 1966; Timmer, 1988; 
Christiansen, Demery & Kuhl, 2011). The 
benefits from the transformation of agriculture 
are abundant such as cheaper food, release of 
labor, raw material for the industrial sector 
and savings, but its main result is the interplay 
between all these benefits or the so called link-
ages across sectors (Johnston & Mellor, 1961). 
Latecomers aspiring to catch up through the 
transformation of agriculture are indeed im-
proving resource allocation through linkages 
across economic sectors, but they need to be 
aware that as the agricultural sector becomes 
more productive, its income share in total 
gdp declines and therefore less likely to act as 
a source of catching up growth in the long run 
(Rodrik, 2014). Hence the transition out of 
dualism in today´s developing countries can 
be captured through the agricultural gap share, 
that is, the difference between the agricultural 
contribution to gdp and the agricultural labor 
share, so that a reduction of this difference im-
plies the convergence of the agricultural sectors 
in terms of productivity and trade towards a 
sectoral pattern close to those existing in de-
veloped countries (Timmer, 1988; Andersson 
& Palacio, 2016a). 
Apart from the fact that the popula-
tion is usually better fed since the rise of the 
agricultural productivity, an important part 
of the transformation is the employment of 
some excess labor in the modern sectors of the 
economy (Lewis, 1954; Gollin et al., 2013). 
The traditional sectors, which usually have 
the greatest capacity to absorb labour, are 
becoming economically less significant: fam-
ily farming and micro enterprises. In other 
words, the emergence of larger firms seems to 
be a clear sign of transformation. At the same 
time, the dual nature of growth in most devel-
oping countries today is characterized by the 
expansion of the service sector rather than a 
labor-intensive manufacturing sector (Ghani 
& O´Donnell, 2014). But the service sector 
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is large and heterogeneous in terms of sectoral 
productivity and has so far not been able to 
replace manufacturing to play the main role 
in the process of catching up. In the absence of 
labor-intensive agriculture as in the East Asia 
during the 1970s, and large pools of infor-
mality in the service sector, social protection 
networks are the key to managing the unfor-
tunate consequences of structural change on 
the income distribution (Andersson & Palacio, 
2016b). But this might be prohibetively costly. 
Thus, an understanding about what creates 
employment in (and outside) these declining 
sectors can make the difference between failure 
and success in catching up. Likewise, an indi-
cation of the transformation is the adoption 
of “decent employment” in the formal labor 
market as a summary measure of the important 
aspects of job quality (Ghai, 2003). 
Savings are also an important part of the 
transformation. As in Gerschenkron (1962), 
the access to capital undergoes structural 
change during the development process. Fi-
nancial markets play a vital role in the efficient 
distribution of surplus capital and therefore the 
development of finanical intermediaries is cen-
tral to any development strategy. In a broader 
sense, latecomers will develop new financial 
structures gradually to finance the emerging 
sectors and consumption patterns. Using in-
dicators of the size of equity and public and 
private bonds, countries and regions can be 
grouped according to the stages of finance 
(World Bank, 2006). 
Finally, there is no transformation with-
out changing the stock of technologies in use. 
Technologies are closely linked to its sectoral 
output pattern and to firm size structure, as 
well as to firm level choices. The structure of 
labor and capital markets, which determine 
labor and capital costs to the firm, are key 
determinants both of firm-level technology 
choice and of sectoral composition and firm 
size structure. So the policies affecting the 
capital as well as the labor market are impor-
tant aspects of the transformation of both 
agriculture and non-agriculture and therefore 
the diversification of the economy. 
Inclusion
The second dimension is inclusion, which at its 
most fundamental level is a pro-poor growth 
process where poor people benefit in absolute 
terms (Ravallion & Chen, 2003; Bourgui-
gnon 2002). Inclusion is important given the 
extreme inequality of most developing coun-
tries. Thus, the rate of change in poverty is 
one way of informing us whether the growth 
process has been inclusive or not. Developing 
countries can also signal progress if growth is 
connected to identifiable social segments that 
are potential losers from for instance structural 
changes in the economy. By identifiable social 
groups we mean age, class or caste, disability, 
gender, race, religion, or sexual preferences 
(Buckhardt, 2007). 
One key area is the extent to which the 
economy is open to entry, allowing the develop-
ment of competitive markets. Here it matters 
whether advances in agricultural productivity, 
through its impact on lowering food prices 
translating into lower labor costs, will affect 
employment opportunities outside agriculture 
and, in extension, increased household income 
growth of the rural population (Gelb et al., 2013; 
M a r t i n  A n d e r s s o n  y  A n d r é s  P a l a c i o
1 8
o a s i s ,  N o  2 6  •  J u l i o - D i c i e m b r e  2 0 1 7  •  p p .  7 - 2 3
Grabowski, 2014). Open entry also entails access 
to education (for creating opportunities and ca-
pabilities). For instance, education is associated 
with the change of occupation and also the place 
of residence from the countryside to the town 
or the city, where the context usually demand 
other type of skills. The novelty is though to treat 
education as a right and promote supply driven 
policies for free education as in many parts of 
Africa and Asia (Banerjee & Dufflo, 2011). 
For instance, in Indonesia the effort to use oil 
money in the 1970s to build schools appear to be 
paying off. Education and wages grow faster in 
regions with more schools. Furthermore, Taiwan 
established compulsory schooling in 1968 and 
saw the elimination of the gender gap in educa-
tion and the fastest decline of infant mortality 
in regions experiencing the educational reform.
As noted before, the transformation of 
agriculture should provide more food, rising 
income for unskilled labor, and surplus capital. 
In this line, labor market outcomes are impor-
tant given that, in the absence of strong social 
protection networks or non-competitive finan-
cial markets, they are the only determinants 
of economic welfare for most families (Ghai, 
2003). In other words, the labor market might 
define whether a family is in poverty or not. A 
poverty line, albeit necessary and useful, must 
be complemented with dynamic measures of 
relative poverty that reveal whether the bottom 
10 or 20 or 50% income share is growing faster 
than the top 1 or 10% income share (Raval-
lion & Chen, 2003; Alvaredo, et al., 2016). 
Thus, non-income measures of health, labor 
market outcomes and the rate of change in 
poverty across groups also inform us whether 
the growth process has been inclusive. 
Another indicator of inclusion is access to 
any form of formal credit, and ownership of a 
savings account (Allen et al., 2012). Around 
2.5 billion people have no access to financial 
services at all and have to rely on informal 
mechanisms to save or insure themselves 
against economic shocks (Ledgerwood, et 
al., 2013; World Bank, 2017). Indicators of 
financial inclusion are associated with lower 
banking costs and greater proximity to finan-
cial providers. In this line, policies aimed to 
promote inclusion such as offering basic or 
low-fee accounts, granting exemptions from 
onerous documentation requirements, allow-
ing correspondent banking, and using bank 
accounts to make government payments are 
especially effective among those most likely to 
be excluded: poor and rural residents. Around 
twenty percent of rural households living on 
less than a dollar a day have access to credit (Ba-
nerjee & Duflo, 2011). Microfinance might 
play an important role in providing a safety 
net and in consumption smoothing. Whether 
it should be considered an important compo-
nent of an inclusion strategy depends on the 
answer to the question of how much savings 
it does facilitate. At a general level, economic 
actors in countries with lower costs of access 
to financial services are more likely to mobilize 
capital to high value activities. 
Autonomy
We propose that autonomy is the ability of the 
state to keep vested interests at bay. Here an in-
tuitive and simple measure of autonomy can be 
the State´s ability to impose direct and progres-
sive taxation on the non-poor, given that both 
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characteristics are not usually common in the 
tax system of developing economies. The State 
can also tax and subsidize certain goods and 
services with the aim of altering the income 
distribution. If the changes benefit the poorest 
segments of the population without damaging 
the incentive to save and invest of the richest 
segments, the balance between equity gains 
and efficiency losses from taxation (Diamond 
& Mirrlees, 1971) can be achieved, or at least 
used as a benchmark given the political and 
economic context. Apart from examining the 
tax structure, public wealth (public assets mi-
nus public debts) also needs to be considered 
because it determines the ability of the govern-
ment to redistribute income or mitigate rising 
inequality through equalization of primary 
assets such as land, health or education re-
forms. The most notorious example is public 
sovereign funds in Norway, more recently in 
Chile (Adler & Magud, 2013).
The most frequent examples relate to 
monetary/macroeconomic, international 
trade, or perhaps health and education insti-
tutions. In the monetary area, the majority 
of countries have clear objectives: a target for 
inflation rate, which is based on a relatively 
good understanding of the mechanisms that 
link the instruments of policy to the outcomes, 
and implemented through those mechanisms. 
In this area usually the central bank is respon-
sible and has a high degree of control over the 
related policy instruments. Furthermore, a 
generally accepted bureaucracy of technocrats 
carries out the design and the execution of the 
policy, and other branches of political power 
are not expected to dictate policy. Foreign 
trade policy is somehow a similar case. There 
are policy instruments available if the country 
wants to limit or in other ways affect the level 
of exports and imports. Both here and in the 
monetary area, some countries do better than 
others, and capturing these differences pro-
vides clues on the state of autonomy.
Late-comers can catch up with institu-
tional arrangements that do not constraint 
downward national tax levels and ensures 
credible commitments to investors or special 
interest groups and provides opportunities for 
the creation of consensual and representative 
government through “revenue bargaining” be-
tween states and organized citizens (Brautigam 
et al., 2008). Here we believe that the shrink-
ing sectors in terms of employment—family 
farming and the micro, small and medium 
enterprise (msme) sector -- can be part of that 
bargaining chip exercise.
Accountability
While the existence of an autonomous state 
might also lead to arbitrary governance, abuses 
and waste, one should therefore measure 
institutional quality also by the level of ac-
countability, i.e. the quality of governance and 
provision of public goods (Besley & Persson, 
2013). In other words, the patterns of recur-
rent spending on one sector rather than others 
provide light on the most productive sectors 
or those ensuring an expected higher social 
return. Abad and Lindert (2016, p. 244) write 
about Latin America, ` Even before the 1990s, 
when public education was the main form of 
social spending, less was committed to mass 
education than in East Asia, East Europe, or 
the Middle East at similar levels of average 
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income´. Thus, a country that invests little 
in education and infrastructure or invest less 
in its younger generations while favoring the 
seniors and the already well-to-do might be an 
example of low levels of accountability. 
Another example comes from the volatil-
ity of social spending. In market economies, 
we expect to see accountability to be related 
to pro-cyclical social spending. If the country 
does not follow the swings in the economy 
activity, and commits its budget to honor the 
social contract, there are better chances to 
catch up in the long run. Even though the is-
sues discussed here are highly politicized and 
the level of public debate is often insufficient, 
voting out governments, or parties, that do not 
deliver their promises also influence the pro-
cyclical nature of social spending. Thus, late-
comers with increasing or higher levels of so-
cial expenditure than industrialized countries 
when they had similar levels of development 
may be more likely to catch up, and plausibly 
more politically stable. 
conclusIons
In this paper we propose a conceptual frame-
work for identification and measurement of 
social capability enabling analyses of actual 
and potential processes of economic catch up 
among developing countries. Taking the dis-
cussion by Abramovitz and others as a theo-
retical point of departure, we argue that such 
capabilities are the societal abilities to respond 
to investment and innovation incentives, 
which cause sustained growth and therefore 
catching up. Looking at old and recent histori-
cal examples of catching up, we argue that an 
economy endowed with social capability can 
develop resilience to economic shrinking as 
well as achieve sustained growth. By explor-
ing the global hierarchy of the last 60 years, 
we conclude that it over the entire period has 
diverged, albeit with dramatic changes within, 
fuelled by the rise of two tiers of Asian coun-
tries, and the relative decline of Latin America 
and Sub-saharan Africa. We also note the rela-
tively strong growth performance of the latter 
regions over the last decades. To fully grasp 
the catch up process, we realize that relatively 
free technology and high capital returns are 
not enough to catch up in the long run, and 
social capability are indeed the underlying in-
stitutional arrangenement behind the process 
of using production factors efficently while 
honoring the social contract. 
The key capabilities relate to processes of 
transformation through the increased efficiency 
in the use of factors of production, of inclusion 
through the extent to which the economy is 
open to access and entitles people to take pro-
ductive part of economic ativities, supported 
by the autonomy and accountability of the 
State as a vehicle to insulate elite pressure and 
promote nationbuilding and prosperity. Thus, 
we see capability as a set of at least four pro-
cesses, not variables, which are well grounded 
in theory and empirics, to which we assign 
responsability for the catching up dynamics. 
We also realize that these processes are mul-
tidimensional, endogenous, and interactive. 
Thus there is no surprise that the literature has 
not been able to provide a summary measure 
that captures all that matter in the proccess of 
building social capability. However, the criteria 
used to choose the indicators to make possible 
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comparative analysis of catching up should be 
transparent, quantifiable and traceable over 
time. This will analytically enrich the study 
of different catching up experiences in the 
developing world and provide possibilities to 
assess whether the process might be sustained 
or just constitute a temporary flash. 
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